Nietzsche's Conception of Truth: Correspondence, Coherence, or Pragmatist?
Justin Remhof
Abstract
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Justin Remhof
Abstract
Open-access reader
ABSTRACT Nearly every common theory of truth has been attributed to Nietzsche, while some commentators have argued that he simply has no theory of truth. This essay argues that Nietzsche's remarks on truth are better situated within either the coherence or pragmatist theories of truth than the correspondence theory. Nietzsche's thoughts conflict with the correspondence framework because he believes that the truth conditions of propositions are constitutively dependent on our actions.
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ABSTRACT Nearly every common theory of truth has been attributed to Nietzsche, while some commentators have argued that he simply has no theory of truth. This essay argues that Nietzsche's remarks on truth are better situated within either the coherence or pragmatist theories of truth than the correspondence theory. Nietzsche's thoughts conflict with the correspondence framework because he believes that the truth conditions of propositions are constitutively dependent on our actions.
Key concepts: Coherence theory of truth, Pragmatism, Pragmatic theory of truth, Philosophy, Epistemology, Coherence (philosophical gambling strategy), Situated, Physics