1999PubMedRequires access

Human error and crew resource management failures in Naval aviation mishaps: a review of U.S. Naval Safety Center data, 1990-96.

Douglas A. Wiegmann, Scott A. Shappell

Open publisher page 65 citations

Abstract

The present study examined the role of human error and crew-resource management (CRM) failures in U.S. Naval aviation mishaps. All tactical jet (TACAIR) and rotary wing Class A flight mishaps between fiscal years 1990-1996 were reviewed. Results indicated that over 75% of both TACAIR and rotary wing mishaps were attributable, at least in part, to some form of human error of which 70% were associated with aircrew human factors. Of these aircrew-related mishaps, approximately 56% involved at least one CRM failure. These percentages are very similar to those observed prior to the implementation of aircrew coordination training (ACT) in the fleet, suggesting that the initial benefits of the program have not persisted and that CRM failures continue to plague Naval aviation. Closer examination of these CRM-related mishaps suggest that the type of flight operations (preflight, routine, emergency) do play a role in the etiology of CRM failures. A larger percentage of CRM failures occurred during non-routine or extremis flight situations when TACAIR mishaps were considered. In contrast, a larger percentage of rotary wing CRM mishaps involved failures that occurred during routine flight operations. These findings illustrate the complex etiology of CRM failures within Naval aviation and support the need for ACT programs tailored to the unique problems faced by specific communities in the fleet.

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What this paper is about

The present study examined the role of human error and crew-resource management (CRM) failures in U.S. Naval aviation mishaps. All tactical jet (TACAIR) and rotary wing Class A flight mishaps between fiscal years 1990-1996 were reviewed. Results indicated that over 75% of both TACAIR and rotary wing mishaps were attributable, at least in part, to some form of human error of which 70% were associated with aircrew human factors. Of these aircrew-related mishaps, approximately 56% involved at least one CRM failure. These percentages are very similar to those observed prior to the implementation of aircrew coordination training (ACT) in the fleet, suggesting that the initial benefits of the program have not persisted and that CRM failures continue to plague Naval aviation. Closer examination of these CRM-related mishaps suggest that the type of flight operations (preflight, routine, emergency) do play a role in the etiology of CRM failures. A larger percentage of CRM failures occurred during non-routine or extremis flight situations when TACAIR mishaps were considered. In contrast, a larger percentage of rotary wing CRM mishaps involved failures that occurred during routine flight operations. These findings illustrate the complex etiology of CRM failures within Naval aviation and support the need for ACT programs tailored to the unique problems faced by specific communities in the fleet.

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Available abstract

The present study examined the role of human error and crew-resource management (CRM) failures in U.S. Naval aviation mishaps. All tactical jet (TACAIR) and rotary wing Class A flight mishaps between fiscal years 1990-1996 were reviewed. Results indicated that over 75% of both TACAIR and rotary wing mishaps were attributable, at least in part, to some form of human error of which 70% were associated with aircrew human factors. Of these aircrew-related mishaps, approximately 56% involved at least one CRM failure. These percentages are very similar to those observed prior to the implementation of aircrew coordination training (ACT) in the fleet, suggesting that the initial benefits of the program have not persisted and that CRM failures continue to plague Naval aviation. Closer examination of these CRM-related mishaps suggest that the type of flight operations (preflight, routine, emergency) do play a role in the etiology of CRM failures. A larger percentage of CRM failures occurred during non-routine or extremis flight situations when TACAIR mishaps were considered. In contrast, a larger percentage of rotary wing CRM mishaps involved failures that occurred during routine flight operations. These findings illustrate the complex etiology of CRM failures within Naval aviation and support the need for ACT programs tailored to the unique problems faced by specific communities in the fleet.

Key concepts: Aircrew, Aeronautics, Crew, Aviation, Human error, Crew resource management, Engineering, Aviation medicine

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Human error and crew resource management failures in Naval aviation mishaps: a review of U.S. Naval Safety Center data, 1990-96. — Research Paper | ScholarLens