2014Unpublished venueRequires access

Behavioral Economics and Plea Bargaining

Russell D. Covey

Open publisher page 3 citations

Abstract

Numerous documented cognitive biases, including loss aversion, confirmation bias, and overconfidence, seem to work against resolution of criminal cases through plea bargaining, since doing so requires a criminal defendant to accept immediate loss (punishment) and forfeit the possibility of no loss (acquittal) in exchange for a future benefit (reduction of punishment). This chapter considers why plea bargaining is so prevalent in the US criminal justice system, notwithstanding the existence of so much potentially plea-discouraging cognitive bias. The principal explanation is that the criminal justice system is functionally designed to overcome cognitive bias in order to induce defendants to plead guilty. Incorporation of the insights of behavioral economics into plea-bargaining theory provides a more nuanced explanation of the shape of many features of our criminal justice system and casts new light on the factors that drive plea-bargaining outcomes.

About this research paper

What this paper is about

Numerous documented cognitive biases, including loss aversion, confirmation bias, and overconfidence, seem to work against resolution of criminal cases through plea bargaining, since doing so requires a criminal defendant to accept immediate loss (punishment) and forfeit the possibility of no loss (acquittal) in exchange for a future benefit (reduction of punishment). This chapter considers why plea bargaining is so prevalent in the US criminal justice system, notwithstanding the existence of so much potentially plea-discouraging cognitive bias. The principal explanation is that the criminal justice system is functionally designed to overcome cognitive bias in order to induce defendants to plead guilty. Incorporation of the insights of behavioral economics into plea-bargaining theory provides a more nuanced explanation of the shape of many features of our criminal justice system and casts new light on the factors that drive plea-bargaining outcomes.

Why it matters

OpenAlex reports 3 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.

Key contribution

A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.

Method / approach

Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Main findings

Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Limitations

Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Applications

Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Available abstract

Numerous documented cognitive biases, including loss aversion, confirmation bias, and overconfidence, seem to work against resolution of criminal cases through plea bargaining, since doing so requires a criminal defendant to accept immediate loss (punishment) and forfeit the possibility of no loss (acquittal) in exchange for a future benefit (reduction of punishment). This chapter considers why plea bargaining is so prevalent in the US criminal justice system, notwithstanding the existence of so much potentially plea-discouraging cognitive bias. The principal explanation is that the criminal justice system is functionally designed to overcome cognitive bias in order to induce defendants to plead guilty. Incorporation of the insights of behavioral economics into plea-bargaining theory provides a more nuanced explanation of the shape of many features of our criminal justice system and casts new light on the factors that drive plea-bargaining outcomes.

Key concepts: Plea, Acquittal, Criminal justice, Punishment (psychology), Cognitive bias, Criminology, Behavioral economics, Law and economics

Related papers

Back to paper searchBrowse research topicsOriginal source
Behavioral Economics and Plea Bargaining — Research Paper | ScholarLens