Training and Developing Army Leaders

General Shinseki chartered the Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) to study training and leader development in light of Army Transformation and the new operational environment. As part of the Transformation process, the panel was asked to identify the characteristics and skills required for leaders of the transforming force. General Shinseki also tasked the panel to examine the current systems for training and leader development to see what changes would provide the best leaders for our Army and the best Army for our nation. The study was released 25 May. THE 21ST CENTURY brings new challenges for Army leaders. Information is now a doctrinal element of combat power, and technologies associated with information offer the potential to change the way the Army wages war. Technology that provides real-time information throughout our combat formations is seen by many as our edge against industrial-age armies. But technology alone cannot provide the dominance required to win. The centerpiece of our formations remains quality leaders and their soldiers... not technology. Technology is only a part of the equation. The more complex portion is leadership. The key to victory is the combination of information-age technology and capable leaders who enable the United States Army to dominate adversaries on full spectrum battlefields. Armed with better situtational understanding, leaders can make bold, quick decisions to solve complex problems. Changing missions and increased urban and complex terrain call for selfaware leaders who can operate and adapt across the full spectrum of operations. In today's operational environment, tactical actions by lieutenants, sergeants, corporals and their commanders can have strategic consequences with lasting impact on Na. tional policy. These demands highlight the need tc assess our current training and leader developmen doctrine and programs to determine whether the, will provide the leaders required for increasingly complex battlefields that are anticipated over th, next 25 years. More than a decade after the Cold War ended, th unitary, exclusive focus on fighting the Soviet Unio is gone. US strategy and interests mandate an Arm trained and ready for major theater wars, smalle scale contingencies and peacetime military engage ments. The foundation of this full spectrum credibility is our ability to dominate land combat. Our demonstrated warfighting ability enhances deterrence by allowing the National Command Authority to deter conflict and, when deterrence fails, to enter and dominate combat on our terms. Adversaries know they cannot win conventional, high intensity clashes with US forces, so the threat to Army forces is increasingly unconventional and asymmetric. Threats have ready access to off-the-shelf technologies that can confound our units and inflict casualties as much for political effect as for tactical advantage. Battles will migrate into urban and complex terrain where US standoff weapons offer few advantages and the proximity of noncombatants limits US firepower. The elusive threat in close, complex terrain will challenge our leaders and their soldiers as never before. Technology continues to change the way the Army trains and operates. Increasingly lethal weapons and breakthroughs in command and control improve US forces' effectiveness, but not uniformly. Legacy, digital and Interim forces operating in the same area challenge commanders and staffs to combine their capabilities effectively. US forces lack a technological monopoly; even adversaries without a research and development capability can purchase remarkably sophisticated systems. Army leaders in this technology-rich environment must be able to adopt emerging capabilities and adapt them to their rapidly changing operational environment. Success in full spectrum operations depends on leaders who consistently make better and faster decisions than their opponents, which means battle command education and training must evolve and expand. …