Functional Alignment of Army Branches: A Key for Change

MR Insights In June 1999, shortly after his appointment as Chief of Staff of Army (CSA), General Eric K. Shinseki said his goal was provide strategic leadership [to] keep Army preeminent land warfighting force in world.1 He postulated six objectives: * Increase strategic responsiveness. * Develop a clear long-term strategy to improve operational joint readiness and to implement Joint Vision 2010 goals. * Develop leaders for joint warfighting. * Complete full integration of Active (AC) and Reserve Components (RC). * Fill all warfighting units. * Provide for well-being of soldiers, civilians and family members.2 Shinseki then set azimuth for a more deployable, lethal force that would be properly manned and equipped to accomplish US national military strategy. Given continuous and growing gap between funding and military requirements, this task would require looking hard at competing programs and capabilities and making difficult decisions on nature of traditional Army roles and capabilities. Fight to Win or Adapt to Win? The Army's ultimate business is to fight and win nation's wars. However, it is currently involved in many activities that do not match traditional roles. In 1997, Assistant Secretary of Defense John T. White, addressing Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Board, said, We are at a pivotal point in history where Cold War recedes in past and a new century rushes toward us.3 The QDR challenges Army to develop new strategy and capabilities for an era that will have fewer resources. According to White, this effort would involve some choices and only sacred cow is a strong defense.4 To realize his vision and set Army's fiscal course, Shinseki will have to make these hellish choices. In Fighting for Future: Will America Triumph? Ralph Peters suggests there is a fundamental asymmetry between kind of military force we have and kind we need.5 Peters' underlying theme is that we are preparing for war we want to fight ... not conflicts we cannot avoid.6 Clearly, Shinseki is taking steps to avoid this trap and is trying to bring strategic relevance and balance to Army without risking nation's peace and prosperity. Changes in force structure and traditional roles are inevitable. Inherent parochialism and branch pride will be most challenging hurdle to negotiate as Army moves toward becoming a strategic force. As Army modifies force structure and creates a doctrine tailored for tomorrow's conflicts, it must assess current branches and their contribution to warfighting. On 22 April 1898, Congress provided that the organized and active land forces of United States shall consist of Army of United States and of militia of several States when called into service of United States.7 AC and RC organization and functions have evolved over time to meet tasks required for prompt and sustained operations on land.8 After World War II Army's roles and missions were to defeat enemy land forces, seize and occupy terrain, defend land areas, shoot down aircraft, conduct amphibious and airborne operations, provide intelligence and sustain itself over long periods of time.9 Indeed, Army has met a range of challenges with competent, confident soldiers trained to perform specific functions that contributed to overall combat effectiveness. Over time, functions and associated technology generated unique skills and competencies that gave birth to various branches. The branches became platform-centric, gaining autonomy and specificity in warfighting. Current and forecasted threats, service roles and missions and technology influenced branch perpetuity and relevance, which led to plump budgets for operations and maintenance and future systems. Branch success was measured by new weapon system on horizon or an improved budget. …