Russia`s nuke complex: A case for downsizing

Nuclear weapons stored in former Soviet republics, uncontrolled export of bomb-grade nuclear materials, and recruitment of ex-Soviet nuclear physicists by Third-World nations remain today`s top proliferation risks, reports Oleg Bukharin, a visiting researcher at Princeton University`s Center for Energy and Environment Studies. To address these risks, Russia {open_quotes}must shift its weapons production and development to weapons dismantlement, management of weapons materials, and maintenance of a much smaller...arsenal,{close_quotes} Bukharin writes. The goal of such conversion, he says, {open_quotes}is a nuclear complex that is environmentally safe...and compatible with nonproliferation objectives.{close_quotes} Reconfiguration of Russia`s weapons complex also must provide for redeployment of the hundreds of thousands of scientists, engineers, and technicians who have supported the federation`s nuclear weapons program, Bukharin insists. {open_quotes}A truly durable strategy to prevent the dispersion of Russian weapons expertise must [involve] these weapons experts in non-weapons research,{close_quotes} says Bukharin. Furthermore, Bukharin writes, the Russian conversion program must prevent nuclear materials from falling into the wrong hands. {open_quotes}Widespread corruption, crime, and emerging black markets increase the risk of diversion of weapons-grade uranium or plutonium,{close_quotes} he says.