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Dismantling weapons: How will we know?

M.A. Brown

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Abstract

The United States has pledged to reduce its stockpile of nuclear weapons and has committed one-half billion dollars to helping the Russian Federation do the same. However, US and Russian efforts to reduce the stockpile of nuclear weapons likely will engender some complications, says Mark A. Brown, a senior analyst in the US Congress` Office of Technology Assessment. Specifically, writes Brown, we currently lack any provisions for formal verification of warhead and dismantlement. In fact, Brown contends, under certain US-Russian treaties - including the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty - nuclear warheads removed from missiles covered by the treaty could be redeployed on new missiles that fall beyond the treaty`s provisions. {open_quotes}Lack of verification...will inevitably cause each nation to become increasingly uncertain about the number of warheads...stockpiled by the other nation,{close_quotes} Brown writes. To be effective, Brown concludes, dismantlement programs must be accompanied by verification measures that provide accurate inventories of weapons and materials, cite planned uses for these materials once they have been removed from weapons, and establish a monitoring and security system for stored nuclear materials.

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The United States has pledged to reduce its stockpile of nuclear weapons and has committed one-half billion dollars to helping the Russian Federation do the same. However, US and Russian efforts to reduce the stockpile of nuclear weapons likely will engender some complications, says Mark A. Brown, a senior analyst in the US Congress` Office of Technology Assessment. Specifically, writes Brown, we currently lack any provisions for formal verification of warhead and dismantlement. In fact, Brown contends, under certain US-Russian treaties - including the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty - nuclear warheads removed from missiles covered by the treaty could be redeployed on new missiles that fall beyond the treaty`s provisions. {open_quotes}Lack of verification...will inevitably cause each nation to become increasingly uncertain about the number of warheads...stockpiled by the other nation,{close_quotes} Brown writes. To be effective, Brown concludes, dismantlement programs must be accompanied by verification measures that provide accurate inventories of weapons and materials, cite planned uses for these materials once they have been removed from weapons, and establish a monitoring and security system for stored nuclear materials.

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Available abstract

The United States has pledged to reduce its stockpile of nuclear weapons and has committed one-half billion dollars to helping the Russian Federation do the same. However, US and Russian efforts to reduce the stockpile of nuclear weapons likely will engender some complications, says Mark A. Brown, a senior analyst in the US Congress` Office of Technology Assessment. Specifically, writes Brown, we currently lack any provisions for formal verification of warhead and dismantlement. In fact, Brown contends, under certain US-Russian treaties - including the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty - nuclear warheads removed from missiles covered by the treaty could be redeployed on new missiles that fall beyond the treaty`s provisions. {open_quotes}Lack of verification...will inevitably cause each nation to become increasingly uncertain about the number of warheads...stockpiled by the other nation,{close_quotes} Brown writes. To be effective, Brown concludes, dismantlement programs must be accompanied by verification measures that provide accurate inventories of weapons and materials, cite planned uses for these materials once they have been removed from weapons, and establish a monitoring and security system for stored nuclear materials.

Key concepts: Nuclear weapon, Stockpile, Treaty, Warhead, Arms control, Political science, Law, Russian federation

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