A Proposal for Reform of the Plea Bargaining Process

Prosecutorial efforts to induce guilty pleas play a central role in the administration of criminal justice. In most jurisdictions prosecutors grant special concessions-usually dismissals of certain charges or reduced sentence recommendations --to defendants who enter guilty pleas and thus waive their constitutional right to a trial before a judge or jury.2 This bargaining practice disposes of a remarkably high percentage of cases.3 Despite commentators' arguments in favor of abolishing plea bargaining,4 the Supreme Court recently acknowledged its validity in Brady v. United States.5 The defendant in Brady was charged with kidnapping and faced a possible maximum penalty of death upon conviction by a jury.6 By pleading guilty he reduced the maximum possible sentence to life imprisonment.7 In a subsequent action he sought to invalidate his plea on the grounds that it was induced both by his fear of the death penalty and by the prosecutor's representations concerning reduction of sentence and clemency. With regard to the latter claim, the Court noted: