The political economy of anititrust [i.e. antitrust]
Vivek Ghosal, John Stennek
Abstract
Vivek Ghosal, John Stennek
Abstract
Issues in Antitrust Enforcement, Remembrance of Things Past: Antitrust, Ideology, and the Development of Industrial Economics. The Impact of the Corporate Leniency Program on Cartel Formation and the Cartel Price Path. Optimal Fines in the Era of Whistleblowers: Should Price Fixers Still go to Prison? Instruments for Cartel Deterrence, and Conflicts of Interests. Lessons for Competition Policy from the Vitamins Cartel. Effectiveness of Antitrust Sanctions on Modern International Cartels The Economics of Tacit Collusion in Merger Analysis. The Economics and Politics of International Merger Enforcement: A Case Study of the GE/Honeywell Merger. The Political Economy of EU Merger Control: Small versus Large Member State Interests. A Consumers Surplus Defense in Merger Control. EU Merger Remedies: A Preliminary Empirical Assessment. The Significant Impediment of Effective Competition Test in the New European Merger Regulation: In Theory and Practice. Vertical Restraints and the Effects of Upstream Horizontal Mergers. Political Stabilization by an Independent Regulator. Saving Section 2: Reframing U.S. Monopolization Law. Private Antitrust Litigation: Procompetitive or Anticompetitive? Antitrust in Open Economies.
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Issues in Antitrust Enforcement, Remembrance of Things Past: Antitrust, Ideology, and the Development of Industrial Economics. The Impact of the Corporate Leniency Program on Cartel Formation and the Cartel Price Path. Optimal Fines in the Era of Whistleblowers: Should Price Fixers Still go to Prison? Instruments for Cartel Deterrence, and Conflicts of Interests. Lessons for Competition Policy from the Vitamins Cartel. Effectiveness of Antitrust Sanctions on Modern International Cartels The Economics of Tacit Collusion in Merger Analysis. The Economics and Politics of International Merger Enforcement: A Case Study of the GE/Honeywell Merger. The Political Economy of EU Merger Control: Small versus Large Member State Interests. A Consumers Surplus Defense in Merger Control. EU Merger Remedies: A Preliminary Empirical Assessment. The Significant Impediment of Effective Competition Test in the New European Merger Regulation: In Theory and Practice. Vertical Restraints and the Effects of Upstream Horizontal Mergers. Political Stabilization by an Independent Regulator. Saving Section 2: Reframing U.S. Monopolization Law. Private Antitrust Litigation: Procompetitive or Anticompetitive? Antitrust in Open Economies.
Key concepts: Cartel, Monopolization, Price fixing, Sanctions, Competition law, Merger control, Monopoly, Economics