Administrative Law: Judicial Supervision of Administrative Decision-Making in Action

See generally Freedman, Crisis and Legitimacy in the Administrative Process, 27 STAN.L. REV.1041 (1975).2. The nondelegation doctrine of administrative law emerged from initial arguments that the creation of administrative agencies authorized to perform a combination of legislative, judicial and executive functions violated the Constitutional scheme of separation of powers.Under the doctrine as it has evolved, courts have not imposed stringent constitutional restrictions on the scope of agency functions.See S. BREYER & R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULA-TORY POLICY 37-84 (1979) [hereinafter cited as BREYER & STEWART].3. See, e.g., Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy.Another Look at Rulemaking and Adudication and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA.L. REV.485 (1970).4. Deficiencies attributed to the administrative process include charges that agencies are biased in favor of industry interests, that they are headed by inexperienced appointees chosen on the basis of political considerations, that they are unable to safeguard the growing concerns of significant segments of society, such as consumers and the poor, and that agency procedure is costly, time-consuming and unproductive.See generally R. FELLMETH, THE INTERSTATE COM-MERCE OMISSION (1970); Stewart, The Reformation ofAmerican Administrative Law, 88 HARV.L. REV.1669, 1681-87 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Stewart].5. The legislative and executive branches have not been immune from the clamor for regulatory overhaul.Deregulation of certain industries, such as the airline industry, and increased use of congressional veto power over agency action, (See Miller & Knapp, The Congressional Veto: Preserving the Constitutional Framework, 52 IND.L.J. 367, 370 (1977)), represent other forms of governmental response to allegations of administrative failure.For a survey of additional legislative and executive efforts, see BREYER & STEWART, supra note 2, at 144-62.6. See