The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA): The United States, Russian and Chinese Views
Matthew Mowthorpe
Abstract
Matthew Mowthorpe
Abstract
This article examines the United States approach to the current revolution in military affairs (RMA), and examines the key players in promoting this revolution. The elements of the RMA - precision strike, information warfare, and dominant maneuver - are analyzed in turn. The underpinning of space for the RMA is addressed. The United States section concludes with an analysis of the factors driving the RMA and the concern in the United States of other countries embracing the RMA. The Chinese approach to the RMA is examined. The individuals involved in the discourse are identified and the origins of the RMA debate in China are traced. Also, addressed is the attempt to Sinify the RMA. The Russian approach to the RMA is traced, and indeed is the source of the concept called the Military Technical that evolved into the RMA. Key Words: in Military Affairs (RMA); United States; Russia; China The in Military Affairs and the United States The Gulf War and the capabilities it demonstrated saw the development of a new concept, one which was termed the Revolution in Military Affairs. This term was seized upon by Andrew Marshall, the head of Net Assessment in the Pentagon, who had been sponsoring studies in this area for some time.1 Indeed, at the time the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Richard Cheney in regard to the RMA and its potential claimed that this had been demonstrated dramatically.2 However this view is called into question by Stephen Biddle in a recent article: Rather than a revolution through information dominance and precision strike, what the Gulf War really suggests is a new ability to exploit mistakes. This, however, suggests, very different policies. If new technology offered tremendous military power to any who acquired the new (and reformed their military doctrine to exploit them), this implies a powerful incentive for radical change: those who realize the full potential of the new era would enjoy enhanced security and influence, while those who do not do so risk being left behind. The revolution in military affairs is based primarily on the impact made by the advancement of technologies in the field of information technology, sensors, computing and telecommunications, and the modern military. The concept is defined in the Annual Report to Congress as: A in Military Affairs (RMA) occurs when a nation's military seizes an opportunity to transform its strategy, military doctrine, training, education, organization, equipment, operations, and tactics to achieve decisive military results in fundamentally new ways.4 The interplay of advanced technology and new operational concepts can occur in two distinct ways. The first is the requirements pull, where a new critical operational task emerges which requires the development of new technology to accomplish the new mission. An example of this would be ballistic missile defense, were the proliferation of ballistic missiles and its associated technology created the requirement for theatre missile defense for troops and potentially national ballistic missile defense. The second is the technology push, where a promising new technology spurs the development of a new weapons or operational concept and enables a new mission to be performed. An example of this would be the utilization of the global positioning to navigate for precision munitions. It is the combination of the requirements pull and technology push that has seen the maturation of technology providing new missions which has contributed to the RMA. One of the most influential advocates of this approach in the United Sates Defense establishment was Admiral Owens. Owens' approach is commonly known as the system of systems approach. This approach is based upon architectures and joint operational concepts. It attempts to gather real-time, all-weather, information continuously to formulate dominant battlespace knowledge/ Dominant battlespace knowledge (DBK) involves relaying automated target information to operational plans into a recognized network in which the information can be utilized. …
OpenAlex reports 7 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.
A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
This article examines the United States approach to the current revolution in military affairs (RMA), and examines the key players in promoting this revolution. The elements of the RMA - precision strike, information warfare, and dominant maneuver - are analyzed in turn. The underpinning of space for the RMA is addressed. The United States section concludes with an analysis of the factors driving the RMA and the concern in the United States of other countries embracing the RMA. The Chinese approach to the RMA is examined. The individuals involved in the discourse are identified and the origins of the RMA debate in China are traced. Also, addressed is the attempt to Sinify the RMA. The Russian approach to the RMA is traced, and indeed is the source of the concept called the Military Technical that evolved into the RMA. Key Words: in Military Affairs (RMA); United States; Russia; China The in Military Affairs and the United States The Gulf War and the capabilities it demonstrated saw the development of a new concept, one which was termed the Revolution in Military Affairs. This term was seized upon by Andrew Marshall, the head of Net Assessment in the Pentagon, who had been sponsoring studies in this area for some time.1 Indeed, at the time the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Richard Cheney in regard to the RMA and its potential claimed that this had been demonstrated dramatically.2 However this view is called into question by Stephen Biddle in a recent article: Rather than a revolution through information dominance and precision strike, what the Gulf War really suggests is a new ability to exploit mistakes. This, however, suggests, very different policies. If new technology offered tremendous military power to any who acquired the new (and reformed their military doctrine to exploit them), this implies a powerful incentive for radical change: those who realize the full potential of the new era would enjoy enhanced security and influence, while those who do not do so risk being left behind. The revolution in military affairs is based primarily on the impact made by the advancement of technologies in the field of information technology, sensors, computing and telecommunications, and the modern military. The concept is defined in the Annual Report to Congress as: A in Military Affairs (RMA) occurs when a nation's military seizes an opportunity to transform its strategy, military doctrine, training, education, organization, equipment, operations, and tactics to achieve decisive military results in fundamentally new ways.4 The interplay of advanced technology and new operational concepts can occur in two distinct ways. The first is the requirements pull, where a new critical operational task emerges which requires the development of new technology to accomplish the new mission. An example of this would be ballistic missile defense, were the proliferation of ballistic missiles and its associated technology created the requirement for theatre missile defense for troops and potentially national ballistic missile defense. The second is the technology push, where a promising new technology spurs the development of a new weapons or operational concept and enables a new mission to be performed. An example of this would be the utilization of the global positioning to navigate for precision munitions. It is the combination of the requirements pull and technology push that has seen the maturation of technology providing new missions which has contributed to the RMA. One of the most influential advocates of this approach in the United Sates Defense establishment was Admiral Owens. Owens' approach is commonly known as the system of systems approach. This approach is based upon architectures and joint operational concepts. It attempts to gather real-time, all-weather, information continuously to formulate dominant battlespace knowledge/ Dominant battlespace knowledge (DBK) involves relaying automated target information to operational plans into a recognized network in which the information can be utilized. …
Key concepts: Revolution in Military Affairs, Dominance (genetics), China, Political science, Pentagon, Military history, Information revolution, Military science