2005Routledge eBooksRequires access

Free agency, moral responsibility, and skepticism

John Martin Fischer

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Abstract

Volume I: Concepts and Challenges Part 1. The concepts of Freedom and Moral Responsibility Part 2. Skeptical Worries: The Worry that We Might Not Be Free and Morally Responsible A. Fatalism B. Divine Omniscience Volume II: Determinism Part 1. Causal Determinism A. Causal Determinism and Alternative Possibilities B. Causal Determinism and Sourcehood Part 2. Compatibilist Accounts of Free Will Volume III: Libertarianism, Alternative Possibilites and Moral Responsibility Part 1. Incompatibilist Accounts of Free Will A. Event-Causal Approaches B. Agent-Causal Approaches Part 2. Free Will and Moral Responsibility Volume IV: Free Agency, Moral Responsibility and Skepticism Part 1. Accounts of Acting Freely Part 2. Worries About the Coherence of Free Will and Moral Responsibility

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Volume I: Concepts and Challenges Part 1. The concepts of Freedom and Moral Responsibility Part 2. Skeptical Worries: The Worry that We Might Not Be Free and Morally Responsible A. Fatalism B. Divine Omniscience Volume II: Determinism Part 1. Causal Determinism A. Causal Determinism and Alternative Possibilities B. Causal Determinism and Sourcehood Part 2. Compatibilist Accounts of Free Will Volume III: Libertarianism, Alternative Possibilites and Moral Responsibility Part 1. Incompatibilist Accounts of Free Will A. Event-Causal Approaches B. Agent-Causal Approaches Part 2. Free Will and Moral Responsibility Volume IV: Free Agency, Moral Responsibility and Skepticism Part 1. Accounts of Acting Freely Part 2. Worries About the Coherence of Free Will and Moral Responsibility

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Volume I: Concepts and Challenges Part 1. The concepts of Freedom and Moral Responsibility Part 2. Skeptical Worries: The Worry that We Might Not Be Free and Morally Responsible A. Fatalism B. Divine Omniscience Volume II: Determinism Part 1. Causal Determinism A. Causal Determinism and Alternative Possibilities B. Causal Determinism and Sourcehood Part 2. Compatibilist Accounts of Free Will Volume III: Libertarianism, Alternative Possibilites and Moral Responsibility Part 1. Incompatibilist Accounts of Free Will A. Event-Causal Approaches B. Agent-Causal Approaches Part 2. Free Will and Moral Responsibility Volume IV: Free Agency, Moral Responsibility and Skepticism Part 1. Accounts of Acting Freely Part 2. Worries About the Coherence of Free Will and Moral Responsibility

Key concepts: Free will, Compatibilism, Determinism, Incompatibilism, Moral responsibility, Libertarianism, Skepticism, Epistemology

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