2012•Game TheoryRequires access
Non-credible threats, subgame perfect equilibrium and backward induction
Aviad Heifetz
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Aviad Heifetz
Abstract
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Key concepts: Subgame perfect equilibrium, Subgame, Backward induction, Economics, Mathematical economics, Nash equilibrium, Equilibrium selection, Game theory