Conclusion

Abstract Abstract In this book, I have tried to show that there can be no such thing as free will and, hence, that both compatibilists and incompatibilists are mistaken. The incompatibilist argues that in a deep sense being free is incompatible with determinism, and, hence, if anyone is free in this sense, then determinism is false. The compatibilist argues that people can be deeply free within a deterministic universe, despite the fact that their ability to choose otherwise is only hypothetical. My view is that although both of these positions derive considerable strength from the way that we think about freedom, they are both wrong because there is no deep sense of “free will” to be explicated. Although one can conceive of many varieties of freedom, there can be no single, deep sort of free will to be found. The argument is the same regarding moral responsibility. There is no more profound sense of “moral responsibility” than ‘caused-by-your-character¬ responsibility,’ which, although different from mere causal responsibility, does not closely resemble what philosophers mean by “moral responsibility.”