The manufacturer’s encroachment strategy in the presence of the retailer’s in-store service
Xing Wan, Jing Chen, Bintong Chen
Abstract
Xing Wan, Jing Chen, Bintong Chen
Abstract
We examine the manufacturer’s encroachment strategy in the supply chain in the presence of the retailer’s in-store service. The manufacturer has the option of encroachment with a direct channel, and the retailer has the option of providing in-store service. If the retailer decides to offer service, it sets the service level. We show that in the presence of in-store service, the manufacturer is less likely to encroach on the retail market than in the absence of in-store service. The retailer always prefers to provide in-store service. If the manufacturer decides to encroach, it will strategically use its direct channel with no sales as a threat to the retailer, independent of whether or not the retailer provides in-store service. The retailer can be better off with manufacturer encroachment, but it can be worse off when consumer sensitivity to in-store service is very low. We show that the retailer can strategically employ in-store service to deter the manufacturer’s encroachment when the consumer sensitivity to in-store service is sufficiently high.
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We examine the manufacturer’s encroachment strategy in the supply chain in the presence of the retailer’s in-store service. The manufacturer has the option of encroachment with a direct channel, and the retailer has the option of providing in-store service. If the retailer decides to offer service, it sets the service level. We show that in the presence of in-store service, the manufacturer is less likely to encroach on the retail market than in the absence of in-store service. The retailer always prefers to provide in-store service. If the manufacturer decides to encroach, it will strategically use its direct channel with no sales as a threat to the retailer, independent of whether or not the retailer provides in-store service. The retailer can be better off with manufacturer encroachment, but it can be worse off when consumer sensitivity to in-store service is very low. We show that the retailer can strategically employ in-store service to deter the manufacturer’s encroachment when the consumer sensitivity to in-store service is sufficiently high.
Key concepts: Business, Service (business), Industrial organization, Operations management, Marketing, Manufacturing engineering, Commerce, Operations research