2022Unpublished venueRequires access

Relativism

James R. Shaw

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Abstract

Abstract This chapter notes that although the “Wittgensteinean” reply to the meaning skeptic through the use of notions of uniformity is importantly distinct from the reply to the skeptic that Kripke attributes to Wittgenstein, it may share with the latter reply a commitment to a certain kind of relativism. Ultimately, this relativism is a familiar, benign form of relativism of language—a relativism in what our words can mean. What is distinctive about the Wittgensteinean view is when and how this kind of relativism arises. Several thought experiments giving rise to this relativism are explored, and its distinctive features are discussed.

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Abstract This chapter notes that although the “Wittgensteinean” reply to the meaning skeptic through the use of notions of uniformity is importantly distinct from the reply to the skeptic that Kripke attributes to Wittgenstein, it may share with the latter reply a commitment to a certain kind of relativism. Ultimately, this relativism is a familiar, benign form of relativism of language—a relativism in what our words can mean. What is distinctive about the Wittgensteinean view is when and how this kind of relativism arises. Several thought experiments giving rise to this relativism are explored, and its distinctive features are discussed.

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Available abstract

Abstract This chapter notes that although the “Wittgensteinean” reply to the meaning skeptic through the use of notions of uniformity is importantly distinct from the reply to the skeptic that Kripke attributes to Wittgenstein, it may share with the latter reply a commitment to a certain kind of relativism. Ultimately, this relativism is a familiar, benign form of relativism of language—a relativism in what our words can mean. What is distinctive about the Wittgensteinean view is when and how this kind of relativism arises. Several thought experiments giving rise to this relativism are explored, and its distinctive features are discussed.

Key concepts: Relativism, Skepticism, Meaning (existential), Epistemology, Philosophy

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