2013•Oxford University Press eBooksRequires access

Replacing Truth

Kevin A. Scharp

Open publisher page 378 citations

Abstract

Scharp proposes an account of the nature and logic of truth, in which truth is an inconsistent concept that should be replaced for certain theoretical purposes. He argues that truth is best understood as an inconsistent concept; develops an axiomatic theory of truth and offers a kind of possible-worlds semantics for this theory.

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What this paper is about

Scharp proposes an account of the nature and logic of truth, in which truth is an inconsistent concept that should be replaced for certain theoretical purposes. He argues that truth is best understood as an inconsistent concept; develops an axiomatic theory of truth and offers a kind of possible-worlds semantics for this theory.

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OpenAlex reports 378 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.

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Available abstract

Scharp proposes an account of the nature and logic of truth, in which truth is an inconsistent concept that should be replaced for certain theoretical purposes. He argues that truth is best understood as an inconsistent concept; develops an axiomatic theory of truth and offers a kind of possible-worlds semantics for this theory.

Key concepts: Semantic theory of truth, Coherence theory of truth, Pragmatic theory of truth, Logical truth, Epistemology, Alethiology, Truth condition, Truth value

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