Replacing Truth
Kevin A. Scharp
Abstract
Kevin A. Scharp
Abstract
Scharp proposes an account of the nature and logic of truth, in which truth is an inconsistent concept that should be replaced for certain theoretical purposes. He argues that truth is best understood as an inconsistent concept; develops an axiomatic theory of truth and offers a kind of possible-worlds semantics for this theory.
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Scharp proposes an account of the nature and logic of truth, in which truth is an inconsistent concept that should be replaced for certain theoretical purposes. He argues that truth is best understood as an inconsistent concept; develops an axiomatic theory of truth and offers a kind of possible-worlds semantics for this theory.
Key concepts: Semantic theory of truth, Coherence theory of truth, Pragmatic theory of truth, Logical truth, Epistemology, Alethiology, Truth condition, Truth value