2011•The MIT Press eBooksRequires access

Traditional Social Choice

Michel Balinski, Rida Laraki

Abstract

This chapter offers information on traditional methods and concepts of social choice theory, including one proposed by Condorcet, known today as Copeland’s method, Borda’s method, Dasgupta-Maskin method, and Nanson’s method. Choice rule versions of Arrow’s impossibility theorem and the fundamentals of Arrow’s model that are comparisons between pairs of alternatives, competitors, or candidates, are also discussed. The Dasgupta-Maskin method focuses on the primacy of a Condorcet-winner that is a strong contender and is one of the dominant concepts in the theory of voting. Two important failures associated with Borda-ranking are its manipulability and violation of independence of irrelevant alternatives.

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Available abstract

Key concepts: Condorcet method, Social choice theory, Arrow's impossibility theorem, Arrow, Independence of irrelevant alternatives, Mathematical economics, Ranking (information retrieval), Independence (probability theory)