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1989•RePEc: Research Papers in EconomicsRequires access

Fixed Agenda Social Choice Theory: Correspondence and Impossibility Theorems for Social Choice Corrispondences and Social Decision Functions

Vincenzo Denicolò

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Abstract

Arrow's Impossibility Theorem is concerned with the problem of finding a collective choice rule which selects one or more alternatives from every non emplty subset of the universal set of alternatives.

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Arrow's Impossibility Theorem is concerned with the problem of finding a collective choice rule which selects one or more alternatives from every non emplty subset of the universal set of alternatives.

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Available abstract

Arrow's Impossibility Theorem is concerned with the problem of finding a collective choice rule which selects one or more alternatives from every non emplty subset of the universal set of alternatives.

Key concepts: Arrow's impossibility theorem, Social choice theory, Arrow, Impossibility, Mathematical economics, Set (abstract data type), Mathematics, Computer science

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Fixed Agenda Social Choice Theory: Correspondence and Impossibility Theorems for Social Choice Corrispondences and Social Decision Functions — Research Paper | ScholarLens