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C4I of Army Deep Operations and Air Interdiction: Fusion of Effort Within the Same Battlespace

Brooke H. Janney

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Abstract

Simultaneous operations within the same battlespace have proven to be a contentious issue for the United States Army and United States Air Force. As surface force weapons and weapon systems capable of long range operations and engagements have proliferated in the last decade, this contention has increased and could arguably be the greatest joint operational issue between the services today. The doctrinal 'lightning rod' of this debate is the Fire Support Coordination Line or FSCL. Its use, placement, and movement have proven to be an issue that seems to defy reconciliation. Yet, when one delves into the issue and the doctrinal underpinnings of it, one finds a deeper, more fundamental proximate cause for the debate rather than the superficial one highlighted by the placement of a coordination measure. The two services are attempting to achieve the same results in the same battlespace. Both are making honest efforts to serve the Joint Force Commander's intent and are fundamentally operating within the frameworks established by joint doctrine. Both are generally operating within the frameworks established by their own service doctrine and neither doctrine is particularly or diametrically opposed to the other. Yet, both services attempt to execute their efforts separately. Each will provide support to the other. Each provides liaison organizations and systems for the other. What we do not seem to be able to do is to execute our operations at the same time and within the same battlespace.

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What this paper is about

Simultaneous operations within the same battlespace have proven to be a contentious issue for the United States Army and United States Air Force. As surface force weapons and weapon systems capable of long range operations and engagements have proliferated in the last decade, this contention has increased and could arguably be the greatest joint operational issue between the services today. The doctrinal 'lightning rod' of this debate is the Fire Support Coordination Line or FSCL. Its use, placement, and movement have proven to be an issue that seems to defy reconciliation. Yet, when one delves into the issue and the doctrinal underpinnings of it, one finds a deeper, more fundamental proximate cause for the debate rather than the superficial one highlighted by the placement of a coordination measure. The two services are attempting to achieve the same results in the same battlespace. Both are making honest efforts to serve the Joint Force Commander's intent and are fundamentally operating within the frameworks established by joint doctrine. Both are generally operating within the frameworks established by their own service doctrine and neither doctrine is particularly or diametrically opposed to the other. Yet, both services attempt to execute their efforts separately. Each will provide support to the other. Each provides liaison organizations and systems for the other. What we do not seem to be able to do is to execute our operations at the same time and within the same battlespace.

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Available abstract

Simultaneous operations within the same battlespace have proven to be a contentious issue for the United States Army and United States Air Force. As surface force weapons and weapon systems capable of long range operations and engagements have proliferated in the last decade, this contention has increased and could arguably be the greatest joint operational issue between the services today. The doctrinal 'lightning rod' of this debate is the Fire Support Coordination Line or FSCL. Its use, placement, and movement have proven to be an issue that seems to defy reconciliation. Yet, when one delves into the issue and the doctrinal underpinnings of it, one finds a deeper, more fundamental proximate cause for the debate rather than the superficial one highlighted by the placement of a coordination measure. The two services are attempting to achieve the same results in the same battlespace. Both are making honest efforts to serve the Joint Force Commander's intent and are fundamentally operating within the frameworks established by joint doctrine. Both are generally operating within the frameworks established by their own service doctrine and neither doctrine is particularly or diametrically opposed to the other. Yet, both services attempt to execute their efforts separately. Each will provide support to the other. Each provides liaison organizations and systems for the other. What we do not seem to be able to do is to execute our operations at the same time and within the same battlespace.

Key concepts: Battlespace, Interdiction, Doctrine, Military doctrine, Engineering, Computer security, Military tactics, Joint (building)

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