Toward Common Joint Targeting: Synchronizing the Battlefield Through Doctrine

The Joint doctrine is defined as "fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces of two or more Services in coordinated action toward a common objective. It will be promulgated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the combatant commands, Services, and the Joint Staff." The purpose of having joint doctrine is to prevent duplication of effort, and to provide a common source of doctrine for joint operations. Between 1991 and 1995 U.S. military forces participated in 51 operations, and all of these were joint operations. The current downsized military coupled with increasing commitments around the globe guarantee that the majority, if not all operations in the future will be joint in nature. Since the majority of recent military operations have been joint operations, and the future seems to hold the same, the importance of this single source of doctrine for all services cannot be stressed enough. "The outstanding characteristic of all joint operations is their relative complexity compared to single Service operations. The increasing complexity of today's forces exacerbates the coordination problem, while the lethality and accuracy of modem weaponry demand a higher standard of control." There are however, several issues in the arena of joint doctrine causing difficulties among the specific service components. One of the most heated arguments deals with the subject of targeting. The current U.S. Army D3A method, Decide, Detect, Deliver, and Assess, is a perfectly acceptable and valuable tool for targeting fires on the Tactical level. It is not suitable for use at the Operational level, as it leaves out some critical aspects of the Joint Process, namely the CINC's Guidance and weaponeering. Although some references state the two methods are interchangeable, this is not true. The D3A process is meant to be used at the tactical level, and is not suitable for use at the Operational level. For this reason, it should not appear in theater level publication, which is at the Operational level. Allowing both targeting models to appear in Joint Publications presents the user with a choice, when there should only be one model available for Operational level targeting in these theaters. This study will compare both methods, with the bulk of the discussion being devoted to the critical differences between the two, and how this effects the targeting process, as it currently exists at the Operational level. This study answers the question of whether or not having two different targeting methodologies appear in joint targeting doctrine violates the purpose of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation, namely to avoid duplication of effort and confusion on the battlefield.