2012Ike Skelton Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) Digital Library (US Army Combined Arms Center)Requires access

Tactical Implications of the M2 Equipped, J-Series Mechanized Infantry Battalion Dismount Strength

Frederic E. Abt

Open publisher page 1 citations

Abstract

Recently, there has been much speculation concerning whether or not the dismount strength in the organizational structure of the M2-equipped, J-series mechanized infantry battalion task force is detrimental to the successful conduct of AirLand Battle tactical doctrine. This paper addresses the issue. This study assesses the battalion task force structure as regards the missions U.S. tactical doctrine intends this unit to complete. The assessment examines current tactical doctrine for employment of the battalion task force. A review of past and foreign experience with mechanized operations examines how the issue of sufficient dismounted infantry to support tactical doctrine has been addressed. Experiences of serving officers in the execution of U.S. tactical doctrine with the current battalion task force structure in Europe and at the National Training Center are next. Finally, conclusions concerning whether or not current structure supports doctrine are made form a comparison of current and past experience in light of U.S. tactical doctrine. This study finds that doctrinally assigned missions which require speed and maneuverability of firepower to destroy an attacking or defending enemy are supported by the current battalion task force structure with its inherent low dismount strength. However, when either doctrine or leadership ignore the inherent manpower limitation found in mechanized forces and assign missions or develop plans requiring considerable manpower over an extended period of time, then current structure with the low dismount strength becomes a liability to successful tactical operation.

About this research paper

What this paper is about

Recently, there has been much speculation concerning whether or not the dismount strength in the organizational structure of the M2-equipped, J-series mechanized infantry battalion task force is detrimental to the successful conduct of AirLand Battle tactical doctrine. This paper addresses the issue. This study assesses the battalion task force structure as regards the missions U.S. tactical doctrine intends this unit to complete. The assessment examines current tactical doctrine for employment of the battalion task force. A review of past and foreign experience with mechanized operations examines how the issue of sufficient dismounted infantry to support tactical doctrine has been addressed. Experiences of serving officers in the execution of U.S. tactical doctrine with the current battalion task force structure in Europe and at the National Training Center are next. Finally, conclusions concerning whether or not current structure supports doctrine are made form a comparison of current and past experience in light of U.S. tactical doctrine. This study finds that doctrinally assigned missions which require speed and maneuverability of firepower to destroy an attacking or defending enemy are supported by the current battalion task force structure with its inherent low dismount strength. However, when either doctrine or leadership ignore the inherent manpower limitation found in mechanized forces and assign missions or develop plans requiring considerable manpower over an extended period of time, then current structure with the low dismount strength becomes a liability to successful tactical operation.

Why it matters

OpenAlex reports 1 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.

Key contribution

A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.

Method / approach

Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Main findings

Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Limitations

Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Applications

Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Available abstract

Recently, there has been much speculation concerning whether or not the dismount strength in the organizational structure of the M2-equipped, J-series mechanized infantry battalion task force is detrimental to the successful conduct of AirLand Battle tactical doctrine. This paper addresses the issue. This study assesses the battalion task force structure as regards the missions U.S. tactical doctrine intends this unit to complete. The assessment examines current tactical doctrine for employment of the battalion task force. A review of past and foreign experience with mechanized operations examines how the issue of sufficient dismounted infantry to support tactical doctrine has been addressed. Experiences of serving officers in the execution of U.S. tactical doctrine with the current battalion task force structure in Europe and at the National Training Center are next. Finally, conclusions concerning whether or not current structure supports doctrine are made form a comparison of current and past experience in light of U.S. tactical doctrine. This study finds that doctrinally assigned missions which require speed and maneuverability of firepower to destroy an attacking or defending enemy are supported by the current battalion task force structure with its inherent low dismount strength. However, when either doctrine or leadership ignore the inherent manpower limitation found in mechanized forces and assign missions or develop plans requiring considerable manpower over an extended period of time, then current structure with the low dismount strength becomes a liability to successful tactical operation.

Key concepts: Infantry, Doctrine, Battle, Military doctrine, Engineering, Aeronautics, Task force, Task (project management)

Related papers

Back to paper searchBrowse research topicsOriginal source
Tactical Implications of the M2 Equipped, J-Series Mechanized Infantry Battalion Dismount Strength — Research Paper | ScholarLens