The Armor Force in Contingency Operations: Do We Have the Right Tactical Doctrine?

This monograph discusses the applicability of current tactical doctrine for armor forces in contingency operations. The shift in our national military strategy from a primary focus on Europe to a greater global perspective calls into question the applicability of our current tactical doctrine. This monograph examines the tactical doctrine armor forces will use in future contingency operations. This monograph first examines the theoretical characteristics of armor and its applicability on the modern battlefield. Next three historical examples of the use of armor in a contingency operation are analyzed: the First Cavalry division on Luzon in 1945, The Blues and Royals in the Falklands, and Operation Just Cause. In all three cases, armor was used in a wide range of missions in support of combat operations. An analysis of selected current doctrinal manuals reveals a lack of tactics and techniques and procedures to support light and heavy force mixes in a contingency operation. Reports from the combat training centers highlight the need for tactical doctrine to support light and heavy force mix operations. Methods for employing armor highlighted in the historical examples are not supported by current tactical doctrine. This study concludes that current tactical doctrine provides the “what to do” but not the “how to” for mixed forces in a contingency operation. Additional tactics, techniques, and procedures are necessary if armor is to perform properly in a contingency operation environment. Specifically, this means integration of light and heavy forces in a wide array of operations. Tactical doctrine must be integrated among the infantry and armor communities to ensure the commander has the most capable force available.