Adequacy of United States Army Tactical Doctrine for the Successful Employment for Armor in Offensive Urban Operations
Shepherd, Lawrence L.
Abstract
Shepherd, Lawrence L.
Abstract
This study examined the adequacy of US Army tactical doctrine for the successful employment of armor in offensive urban operations. Historical case studies on Aachen, Beirut, Grozny, and Baghdad were used to draw lessons learned. These lessons learned were then compared to current US Army tactical doctrine at the company team and platoon levels. The comparisons found US Army tactical doctrine to be adequate to employ armor successfully in offensive urban operations at the company team and platoon levels. However, the comparison of US Army tactical doctrine resulted in a number of recommendations. These recommendations are divided into two groups. First, recommendations are made relative to the lessons learned. Second, recommendations of a general nature not related directly to lessons learned.
A significance statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
This study examined the adequacy of US Army tactical doctrine for the successful employment of armor in offensive urban operations. Historical case studies on Aachen, Beirut, Grozny, and Baghdad were used to draw lessons learned. These lessons learned were then compared to current US Army tactical doctrine at the company team and platoon levels. The comparisons found US Army tactical doctrine to be adequate to employ armor successfully in offensive urban operations at the company team and platoon levels. However, the comparison of US Army tactical doctrine resulted in a number of recommendations. These recommendations are divided into two groups. First, recommendations are made relative to the lessons learned. Second, recommendations of a general nature not related directly to lessons learned.
Key concepts: Offensive, Doctrine, Platoon, Military doctrine, Armour, Engineering, Aeronautics, Operations research