Army tactical requirements for peace support operations.

This paper examines the US Army approach to peace support operations. It reviews the trends in Army doctrine and analyzes their historical foundations from the Cold War in order to determine the accuracy and relevance of the Army approach for its participation in future such operations. As a result of this examination, this study identifies key characteristics of Cold War era peace support operations. It then analyzes two post-Cold War operations to-determine key characteristics of the recent operations. These key characteristics provide the foundation for an assessment of the nature of peace support operations. The operations also provide the basis for deriving lessons at the tactical level for future employment of Army forces. In turn, the lessons for the future provide a basis to determine the adequacy of the Army's trends in preparing forces for peace support operations. The study then presents recommendations for the preparation of combat forces for future missions at the tactical level. The recommendations consider the areas of doctrine, organization, materiel, training, and leader development. They provide suggestions for the Army to adequately prepare combat forces for employment in future peace support operations at the tactical level. Contrary to both past and emerging Army doctrine, peacekeeping and peace enforcement are not separate and distinct operations, but are part of a continuum of peace support operations which the Army may be called upon to execute or support in the near future. Furthermore, peace support operations cannot be isolated in separate compartments such as peacekeeping operations that require minimal/non-use of force, and peace enforcement operations that require overwhelming and decisive combat force to achieve a quick victory followed by an immediate withdrawal. There are no quick and easy solutions. The key characteristics of peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations which are relevant for future peace support operations are the prominence of political considerations, the criticality of civil-military relations, and the multinational flavor of such operations. These characteristics define the true nature of peace support operations. Currently the Army is moving in the wrong direction in its approach to peace support operations. Since doctrine drives organization, materiel, training, and leader development, the Army must adjust its current doctrinal view of peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations to the realities of the current and future international environment. Once it comes to terms with the true nature of peace support operations, the Army must develop new concepts and doctrine for use of force that address the entire continuum of peace support operations. Appropriate guidance on the use of force is critical for employing military forces in such operations. By first focusing on developing new concepts and doctrine for the use of force in the continuum of peace support operations followed by relevant changes in organization, materiel, training, and leader development, the Army will ensure that US forces recognize the complexity and diversity of such operations before they are employed. As a result, US forces will less likely be subject to the confusion and demoralization experienced by units who took part in the Lebanon 1958, Dominican Republic 1965-66, and Lebanon 1982-84 operations when they were faced with changing and diverse missions for which they were inadequately prepared. This will increase the prospects for success of US forces in future peace support operations and set the stage for further development of concepts and doctrine for such operations in other needed areas.