Corps stay-behind force -- a role for the light infantry division on the Central European battlefield.

This paper discusses a role for the light infantry division in Central Europe during a mid- to high-intensity conflict, namely as a stay-behind force in a corps covering force area. The purpose of such a mission would be to disrupt the enemy's rear echelon elements; to delay the advance of his second echelon forces; to provide continuous intelligence to the forces fighting in the main battle area (MBA); and to assist in the parent corps' counter-offensive. The monograph first defines stay-behind operations and forces, and then discusses the missions a stay-behind force can accomplish. Next, it examines the actual conduct of a stay-behind mission for a light infantry division, analyzing the conduct of the operation using the eight operating systems commonly used in after-action reviews at the US Army's National Training Center. Due to its importance to this concept, the study also includes an analysis of the human element of combat during stay-behind operations. Finally, this study discusses the effects of stay-behind operations on an attacking force with emphasis on the effects on, and reaction of, a Soviet force attacking through the light infantry division's area of operations. This monograph concludes that stay-behind forces present the enemy with a dilemma; he can either continue his rapid advance and suffer the accompanying attrition of forces and disruption of tempo certain to occur; or he can commit a large part of his force to clearing the stay-behind forces. Either way, the stay-behind force accomplishes its mission. This concept capitalizes on the synergistic effect that heavy and light forces can generate at the large unit level. The light infantry division is the first headquarters that can adequately coordinate fires, direct the intelligence collection effort of the stay-behind force, and direct the peaks and lulls of stay-behind activity based on corps' requirements. The light infantry division can establish the preconditions for the eventual defeat of a Soviet attack in the MBA by intensifying the effects of friction on the Soviet's advance. They do this by delaying the advance of follow-on echelon forces and disrupting the entire Soviet attack in their sector through interdiction of all aspects of the Soviet's combat, combat support, and combat service support operations in their rear area. The Soviets claim that speed is the necessary prerequisite for a successful attack. Stay-behind forces in significant numbers, an entire division, will deny the Soviets the requisite speed for a successful offensive, and ensure the success of a NATO forward defense.