Carles Esteva Mosso, Simon Vande Walle
Abstract
In most cases, mergers that raise competition problems are not prohibited but approved on condition that the parties remove the anti-competitive effects through remedies. This contribution examines the European Commission's merger remedies practice.
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In most cases, mergers that raise competition problems are not prohibited but approved on condition that the parties remove the anti-competitive effects through remedies. This contribution examines the European Commission's merger remedies practice.
Key concepts: Merger control, European commission, Business, Commission, Competition (biology), Control (management), International trade, Competition policy