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2012•Unpublished venueRequires access

Merger Remedies: Federal Antitrust Service and European Competition Commission Compared

Светлана Авдашева, Maria Kalinina

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Abstract

The article examines the practice of pre-merger notification and merger remedies by Russian antimonopoly authority FAS (on the example of the largest mergers approved in2006—2008) based on a comparison with the practice of the EU Competition Commission. Analysis of markets competition by FAS is shifted towards the straightforward assessment of structure (primarily— measurement of concentration). The structure of remedies isdominated by behavioral (conduct) requirements, many of them cannot be effective andsome may impose on unreasonably high risks on market participants.

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What this paper is about

The article examines the practice of pre-merger notification and merger remedies by Russian antimonopoly authority FAS (on the example of the largest mergers approved in2006—2008) based on a comparison with the practice of the EU Competition Commission. Analysis of markets competition by FAS is shifted towards the straightforward assessment of structure (primarily— measurement of concentration). The structure of remedies isdominated by behavioral (conduct) requirements, many of them cannot be effective andsome may impose on unreasonably high risks on market participants.

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Available abstract

The article examines the practice of pre-merger notification and merger remedies by Russian antimonopoly authority FAS (on the example of the largest mergers approved in2006—2008) based on a comparison with the practice of the EU Competition Commission. Analysis of markets competition by FAS is shifted towards the straightforward assessment of structure (primarily— measurement of concentration). The structure of remedies isdominated by behavioral (conduct) requirements, many of them cannot be effective andsome may impose on unreasonably high risks on market participants.

Key concepts: Commission, Competition (biology), Business, European commission, Merger guidelines, Predatory pricing, Merger control, Market definition

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