2002•Military reviewRequires access

U.S. Army Transformation: The U.K. View

William H. Moore

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Abstract

From the United Kingdom's (U.K.'s) perspective, the U.S. Army transformation process is one of the more adventurous and exciting military programs in the world today. Emerging from U.S. Chief of Staff General Eric K. Shinseki's vision, transformation has moved ahead at a breathtaking pace. The transformation process is an entirely logical program. If successful, it will focus the U.S. Army on key aspects of rapid effect and deployability, making it an appropriate force for the 21st century. The process, which appears to have minimal risk, will improve the legacy force, thus maintaining a strong warfighting capability while developing its interim and objective forces. With adequate funding, transformation will be successful. The U.K. Ministry of Defence differs from its U.S. counterpart in that it is more closely integrated because it is smaller and must make the most economical use of its scarce assets. For example, the U.K. Army does not have its own budget, and procuring equipment is a truly joint affair. Despite rhetoric from the Association of the U.S. Army, U.S. Army transformation might not have the full support of the other U.S. services. Also, despite U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's ongoing review, how much defense support the U.S. Army has in terms of dollars is still unknown. To the outside world U.S. Army transformation seems focused on equipment and the revolution in military affairs. Yet, this is not the focus in discussions with anyone from the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command or with some U.S. Army senior leaders. The U.S. Army, in fact, is taking a holistic view of what it is currently doing, but this picture is not portrayed outside the United States. Some might not consider such an observation valid, but if allies do not have a real grasp of what is happening, they might find it difficult to work out how to best work together. A year after the Labour Government came to power, the U.K. faced no clearly identifiable strategic threat. While its first priority was to ensure national defense, the armed forces were to pursue a more expeditionary role. But how were they to be configured for such a mission? A future battlespace might have many more players than it might have had during the Cold War. The army would operate more closely with maritime and air components to truly project power where it was most needed. More, and different, allies would be involved in coalitions. There would also be more interested parties in theater than hitherto. Contractors; other government departments; nongovernment organizations, such as the Red Cross and other charity-based organizations; the United Nations; bodies like the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe; and multinational cartels would be in theater sooner and remain behind longer. People, possibly neutrals, would continue to depend on the armed forces, support their actions, or be downright hostile to their mere presence. To conduct a successful campaign, a totally integrated approach by all parties would be required to bring a crisis to a satisfactory conclusion. This is the environment in which the U.K. sees itself operating in the future. Allies are key. The U.K. cannot go it alone; therefore, its developmental priorities have been defined accordingly. First and most important is the ability to conduct alliance and coalition warfighting; second is using those same capabilities to conduct national-only war-- fighting (a rerun of the Falklands, for example); third is using the same set of capabilities again. Other U.K. and U.S. allies must operate alongside one another to create such a situation. Equipment interfaces will be important, and how business is conducted should be broadly recognizable, as should our way of thinking-interoperability of the mind is probably the main factor. The United States is running ahead so fast that its allies might not be able to keep pace or even to catch up. …

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What this paper is about

From the United Kingdom's (U.K.'s) perspective, the U.S. Army transformation process is one of the more adventurous and exciting military programs in the world today. Emerging from U.S. Chief of Staff General Eric K. Shinseki's vision, transformation has moved ahead at a breathtaking pace. The transformation process is an entirely logical program. If successful, it will focus the U.S. Army on key aspects of rapid effect and deployability, making it an appropriate force for the 21st century. The process, which appears to have minimal risk, will improve the legacy force, thus maintaining a strong warfighting capability while developing its interim and objective forces. With adequate funding, transformation will be successful. The U.K. Ministry of Defence differs from its U.S. counterpart in that it is more closely integrated because it is smaller and must make the most economical use of its scarce assets. For example, the U.K. Army does not have its own budget, and procuring equipment is a truly joint affair. Despite rhetoric from the Association of the U.S. Army, U.S. Army transformation might not have the full support of the other U.S. services. Also, despite U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's ongoing review, how much defense support the U.S. Army has in terms of dollars is still unknown. To the outside world U.S. Army transformation seems focused on equipment and the revolution in military affairs. Yet, this is not the focus in discussions with anyone from the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command or with some U.S. Army senior leaders. The U.S. Army, in fact, is taking a holistic view of what it is currently doing, but this picture is not portrayed outside the United States. Some might not consider such an observation valid, but if allies do not have a real grasp of what is happening, they might find it difficult to work out how to best work together. A year after the Labour Government came to power, the U.K. faced no clearly identifiable strategic threat. While its first priority was to ensure national defense, the armed forces were to pursue a more expeditionary role. But how were they to be configured for such a mission? A future battlespace might have many more players than it might have had during the Cold War. The army would operate more closely with maritime and air components to truly project power where it was most needed. More, and different, allies would be involved in coalitions. There would also be more interested parties in theater than hitherto. Contractors; other government departments; nongovernment organizations, such as the Red Cross and other charity-based organizations; the United Nations; bodies like the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe; and multinational cartels would be in theater sooner and remain behind longer. People, possibly neutrals, would continue to depend on the armed forces, support their actions, or be downright hostile to their mere presence. To conduct a successful campaign, a totally integrated approach by all parties would be required to bring a crisis to a satisfactory conclusion. This is the environment in which the U.K. sees itself operating in the future. Allies are key. The U.K. cannot go it alone; therefore, its developmental priorities have been defined accordingly. First and most important is the ability to conduct alliance and coalition warfighting; second is using those same capabilities to conduct national-only war-- fighting (a rerun of the Falklands, for example); third is using the same set of capabilities again. Other U.K. and U.S. allies must operate alongside one another to create such a situation. Equipment interfaces will be important, and how business is conducted should be broadly recognizable, as should our way of thinking-interoperability of the mind is probably the main factor. The United States is running ahead so fast that its allies might not be able to keep pace or even to catch up. …

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Available abstract

From the United Kingdom's (U.K.'s) perspective, the U.S. Army transformation process is one of the more adventurous and exciting military programs in the world today. Emerging from U.S. Chief of Staff General Eric K. Shinseki's vision, transformation has moved ahead at a breathtaking pace. The transformation process is an entirely logical program. If successful, it will focus the U.S. Army on key aspects of rapid effect and deployability, making it an appropriate force for the 21st century. The process, which appears to have minimal risk, will improve the legacy force, thus maintaining a strong warfighting capability while developing its interim and objective forces. With adequate funding, transformation will be successful. The U.K. Ministry of Defence differs from its U.S. counterpart in that it is more closely integrated because it is smaller and must make the most economical use of its scarce assets. For example, the U.K. Army does not have its own budget, and procuring equipment is a truly joint affair. Despite rhetoric from the Association of the U.S. Army, U.S. Army transformation might not have the full support of the other U.S. services. Also, despite U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's ongoing review, how much defense support the U.S. Army has in terms of dollars is still unknown. To the outside world U.S. Army transformation seems focused on equipment and the revolution in military affairs. Yet, this is not the focus in discussions with anyone from the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command or with some U.S. Army senior leaders. The U.S. Army, in fact, is taking a holistic view of what it is currently doing, but this picture is not portrayed outside the United States. Some might not consider such an observation valid, but if allies do not have a real grasp of what is happening, they might find it difficult to work out how to best work together. A year after the Labour Government came to power, the U.K. faced no clearly identifiable strategic threat. While its first priority was to ensure national defense, the armed forces were to pursue a more expeditionary role. But how were they to be configured for such a mission? A future battlespace might have many more players than it might have had during the Cold War. The army would operate more closely with maritime and air components to truly project power where it was most needed. More, and different, allies would be involved in coalitions. There would also be more interested parties in theater than hitherto. Contractors; other government departments; nongovernment organizations, such as the Red Cross and other charity-based organizations; the United Nations; bodies like the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe; and multinational cartels would be in theater sooner and remain behind longer. People, possibly neutrals, would continue to depend on the armed forces, support their actions, or be downright hostile to their mere presence. To conduct a successful campaign, a totally integrated approach by all parties would be required to bring a crisis to a satisfactory conclusion. This is the environment in which the U.K. sees itself operating in the future. Allies are key. The U.K. cannot go it alone; therefore, its developmental priorities have been defined accordingly. First and most important is the ability to conduct alliance and coalition warfighting; second is using those same capabilities to conduct national-only war-- fighting (a rerun of the Falklands, for example); third is using the same set of capabilities again. Other U.K. and U.S. allies must operate alongside one another to create such a situation. Equipment interfaces will be important, and how business is conducted should be broadly recognizable, as should our way of thinking-interoperability of the mind is probably the main factor. The United States is running ahead so fast that its allies might not be able to keep pace or even to catch up. …

Key concepts: Interim, Pace, Political science, Law, Management, Operations research, Public administration, Engineering

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