The Army and Society

As Vietnam began to wind down, the US Army and its role in society was debated on several planes, not the least of which was the end of the draft in 1973 and the institution of the All-Volunteer Force concept. Then Lieutenant Colonel Frederic J. Brown Jr. assessed the debate from the perspective of a student at the National War College in this lead article for the March 1972 edition of Military Review. THESE ARE DIFFICULT days for the Military Establishment and particularly the Army. Faced with the need to readjust after a long enervating commitment to a complex, confusing and frustrating war in Vietnam, the Army is seemingly assailed from all sides. Public animosity exceeds that in the previous experience of any of those soldiers presently serving. The fiber of units is stretched by racial stress, drug excess and an environment of hyperactive inquiry if not hostile dissent. In the view of critical observers, the Army not only serves an increasingly questionable social purpose-the use of force in defending the Nation-but also is dysfunctional in that it constitutes a nonproductive, inefficient drain of resources which could be better used to meet pressing social problems. Critical public sentiment often strikes a responsive chord in the Army. The assertion has been made, within the professional ranks, that the Army must become meaningful if it is to continue to exist. The proposition is most often stated to buttress arguments favoring the development of noncombat-related socially productive roles which will not only keep the Army active and committed to the mainstream of American life, but also, because of their utility to the Nation, will serve as added justification for the continued existence of the Army. This proposition is wrong. The greatest current danger to the Army is the stimulus to overinvolvement in efforts to maintain social relevance rather than any isolation stimulated by underinvolvement. The evolving nature of the American society constitutes a reasonable guarantee that the problem for the military profession is not lack of social integration; the character of our postindustrial society will insure that the necessary ties continue to be maintained, even in an all-volunteer force. The Army is already deeply committed to a broad range of social welfare programs. Further, there has been a trend of continually increasing involvement. Isolation is not the problem. The real challenge to the Army today is to conduct responsible and necessary social welfare programs, while preserving those core values of the military which combine to produce units and men who willingly serve the national defense with unlimited liability-to and including the ultimate price. The danger is overcommitment to social welfare programs which can erode the core values and capabilities of unit readiness. The concern is not that the Army exercises social responsibilities. Many are absolutely necessary for management of the Armed Forces or to perform an essential public service such as disaster assistance or civil defense planning. The problem is to subordinate in a responsible manner the aggregate of such efforts to the maintenance of adequate defense readiness. Historical Precedent The Army is engaged today in a broad series of social programs developed over the years in response to general acceptance of an increasing governmental role in providing for the social welfare of individuals and in taking direct responsibility for many other important areas of public life. Current social programs in which the Army is involved have historical precedent in a general tradition of civic assistance provided over the years by the Army. However, in the past, the Army neither saw itself, nor was it seen by others, as possessing enduring responsibilities to conduct programs to improve the lot of any particular individuals in society or to correct social ill, which plagued the Nation. …