The Shapley value for bicooperative games
J.M. Bilbao, J.R. Fernández, Nieves Jiménez, Jorge Jesús López
Abstract
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J.M. Bilbao, J.R. Fernández, Nieves Jiménez, Jorge Jesús López
Abstract
Open-access reader
The aim of the present paper is to study a one-point solution concept for bicooperative games. For these games introduced by Bilbao (2000), we define a one-point solution called the Shapley value, since this value can be interpreted in a similar way to the classical Shapley value for cooperative games. The main result of the paper is an axiomatic characterization of this value.
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The aim of the present paper is to study a one-point solution concept for bicooperative games. For these games introduced by Bilbao (2000), we define a one-point solution called the Shapley value, since this value can be interpreted in a similar way to the classical Shapley value for cooperative games. The main result of the paper is an axiomatic characterization of this value.
Key concepts: Shapley value, Axiom, Mathematical economics, Value (mathematics), Characterization (materials science), Point (geometry), Axiomatic system, Mathematics