Improved Shapley Value for Cooperative Games
Zhao Yan
Abstract
Zhao Yan
Abstract
In this paper,we make a study of the improved Shapley value according to the classical cooperative games.Axioms of Shapley value are used to characterize the improved Shapley value.At last,we apply the improved Shapley value to a profit allocation instance.
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In this paper,we make a study of the improved Shapley value according to the classical cooperative games.Axioms of Shapley value are used to characterize the improved Shapley value.At last,we apply the improved Shapley value to a profit allocation instance.
Key concepts: Shapley value, Axiom, Mathematical economics, Cooperative game theory, Value (mathematics), Profit (economics), Bondareva–Shapley theorem, Mathematics