2005Unpublished venueRequires access

A Post-Auction Evaluation of Auctioned Properties

Poh Har Neo, Seow Eng Ong, Tsur Somerville

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Abstract

The auction mechanism has become an increasingly popular mechanism for price discovery where sellers seek to evaluate market interest. The winner's curse is a well established phenomenon associated with overbidding at auctions. However, auctioned properties could either be sold at the auction or through subsequent privately negotiated sales. Prior research indicates that the price from subsequent private sales could be higher than bids established at auctions. This study seeks to evaluate whether post-auction price movements differ with respect to at-auction or subsequent-to-auction transactions and with respect to non-auctioned sales. In so doing, we also seek to address the issue of winner's curse from a post-auction perspective.

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What this paper is about

The auction mechanism has become an increasingly popular mechanism for price discovery where sellers seek to evaluate market interest. The winner's curse is a well established phenomenon associated with overbidding at auctions. However, auctioned properties could either be sold at the auction or through subsequent privately negotiated sales. Prior research indicates that the price from subsequent private sales could be higher than bids established at auctions. This study seeks to evaluate whether post-auction price movements differ with respect to at-auction or subsequent-to-auction transactions and with respect to non-auctioned sales. In so doing, we also seek to address the issue of winner's curse from a post-auction perspective.

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Available abstract

The auction mechanism has become an increasingly popular mechanism for price discovery where sellers seek to evaluate market interest. The winner's curse is a well established phenomenon associated with overbidding at auctions. However, auctioned properties could either be sold at the auction or through subsequent privately negotiated sales. Prior research indicates that the price from subsequent private sales could be higher than bids established at auctions. This study seeks to evaluate whether post-auction price movements differ with respect to at-auction or subsequent-to-auction transactions and with respect to non-auctioned sales. In so doing, we also seek to address the issue of winner's curse from a post-auction perspective.

Key concepts: Auction theory, Revenue equivalence, Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction, Reverse auction, Vickrey auction, Forward auction, English auction, Generalized second-price auction

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