Selection of an Auction Form
Gregor Berz
Abstract
Gregor Berz
Abstract
Why did the company for awarding the cafeteria construction project 1 select a Dutch auction as negotiation form? It is not very easy for an auctioneer in individual cases to decide which of the four auction forms produces the best result. The Dutch auction essentially provides the same result as a first-price-sealed-bid auction, that is, the highest bid in the form “indifference price plus strategic margin”. On the other hand, a second-price-sealed-bid auction and an English auction are second-price auctions. They both provide the second-best indifference price as final result.
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Why did the company for awarding the cafeteria construction project 1 select a Dutch auction as negotiation form? It is not very easy for an auctioneer in individual cases to decide which of the four auction forms produces the best result. The Dutch auction essentially provides the same result as a first-price-sealed-bid auction, that is, the highest bid in the form “indifference price plus strategic margin”. On the other hand, a second-price-sealed-bid auction and an English auction are second-price auctions. They both provide the second-best indifference price as final result.
Key concepts: English auction, Multiunit auction, Revenue equivalence, Dutch auction, Reverse auction, Generalized second-price auction, Proxy bid, Unique bid auction