Ghislain-Herman Demeze-Jouatsa
Abstract
Demeze-Jouatsa G-H. A complete folk theorem for finitely repeated games. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers. Vol 584. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics; 2018.
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Demeze-Jouatsa G-H. A complete folk theorem for finitely repeated games. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers. Vol 584. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics; 2018.
Key concepts: Folk theorem, Subgame perfect equilibrium, Repeated game, Mathematical economics, Nash equilibrium, Mathematics, Stochastic game, Normal-form game