1996Journal of Financial and Quantitative AnalysisRequires access

Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders

Anup Agrawal, Charles R. Knoeber

Open publisher page 2,885 citations

Abstract

Anup Agrawal, Charles R. Knoeber, Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Sep., 1996), pp. 377-397

About this research paper

What this paper is about

Anup Agrawal, Charles R. Knoeber, Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Sep., 1996), pp. 377-397

Why it matters

OpenAlex reports 2885 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.

Key contribution

A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.

Method / approach

Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Main findings

Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Limitations

Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Applications

Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Available abstract

Anup Agrawal, Charles R. Knoeber, Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Sep., 1996), pp. 377-397

Key concepts: Shareholder, Business, Agency (philosophy), Control (management), Agency cost, Principal–agent problem, Accounting, Industrial organization

Related papers

Back to paper searchBrowse research topicsOriginal source
Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders — Research Paper | ScholarLens