Leegin and Procompetitive Resale Price Maintenance
Kenneth G. Elzinga, David E. Mills
Abstract
Kenneth G. Elzinga, David E. Mills
Abstract
The recent Supreme Court opinion in Leegin reversed the longstanding precedent of Dr. Miles Medical. Resale price maintenance (RPM) is no longer condemned per se but instead is treated under the rule of reason. This ruling allows an inquiry as to the economic rationale and competitive consequences of a manufacturer's RPM policy. This article reviews Leegin's challenged pricing strategy and the business environment in which it arose. Leegin's conduct is interpreted in light of the relevant economic literature about RPM. We conclude that Leegin's price policy fits none of the accepted economic theories of how RPM could be anticompetitive, but instead exemplifies a theory that predicts procompetitive effects. The most compelling explanation for Leegin's conduct is that it sought to induce efficient retail services to support its product line and to increase interbrand competition between the company and its many competitors.
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The recent Supreme Court opinion in Leegin reversed the longstanding precedent of Dr. Miles Medical. Resale price maintenance (RPM) is no longer condemned per se but instead is treated under the rule of reason. This ruling allows an inquiry as to the economic rationale and competitive consequences of a manufacturer's RPM policy. This article reviews Leegin's challenged pricing strategy and the business environment in which it arose. Leegin's conduct is interpreted in light of the relevant economic literature about RPM. We conclude that Leegin's price policy fits none of the accepted economic theories of how RPM could be anticompetitive, but instead exemplifies a theory that predicts procompetitive effects. The most compelling explanation for Leegin's conduct is that it sought to induce efficient retail services to support its product line and to increase interbrand competition between the company and its many competitors.
Key concepts: Resale price maintenance, Rule of reason, Competitor analysis, Supreme court, Competition (biology), Vertical restraints, Economics, Competition law