1999RePEc: Research Papers in EconomicsOpen access

Condorcet Efficiencies Under the Maximal Culture Condition

William V. Gehrlein, Dominique Lepelley

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Abstract

The Condorcet winner in an election is a candidate that could defeat each other candidate in a series of pairwise majority rule elections. The Condorcet efficiency of a voting rule is the conditional probability that the voting rule will elect the Condorcet winner, given that such a winner exists. The study considers the Condorcet efficiency of basic voting rules under various assumptions about how voter preference rankings are obtained. Particular attention is given to situations in which the maximal culture condition is used as a basis for obtaining voter preferences.

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The Condorcet winner in an election is a candidate that could defeat each other candidate in a series of pairwise majority rule elections. The Condorcet efficiency of a voting rule is the conditional probability that the voting rule will elect the Condorcet winner, given that such a winner exists. The study considers the Condorcet efficiency of basic voting rules under various assumptions about how voter preference rankings are obtained. Particular attention is given to situations in which the maximal culture condition is used as a basis for obtaining voter preferences.

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Available abstract

The Condorcet winner in an election is a candidate that could defeat each other candidate in a series of pairwise majority rule elections. The Condorcet efficiency of a voting rule is the conditional probability that the voting rule will elect the Condorcet winner, given that such a winner exists. The study considers the Condorcet efficiency of basic voting rules under various assumptions about how voter preference rankings are obtained. Particular attention is given to situations in which the maximal culture condition is used as a basis for obtaining voter preferences.

Key concepts: Condorcet method, Approval voting, Pairwise comparison, Voting, Majority rule, Anti-plurality voting, Mathematical economics, Bullet voting

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