1998•Journal of Mathematical EconomicsRequires access

The Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and the probability of electing the Condorcet loser

William V. Gehrlein, Dominique Lepelley

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Key concepts: Condorcet method, Approval voting, Voting, Bullet voting, Mathematical economics, Majority rule, Pairwise comparison, Anti-plurality voting

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