Two Myths of Administrative Law
Mark Mancini
Abstract
Mark Mancini
Abstract
In an upcoming set of cases, the Supreme Court of Canada will review its approach to the standard of review of administrative action. In this paper, the author suggests that the Court must go back to the foundation of judicial review in redesigning the standard of review: the task of courts to police the legal boundaries of the administrative state, on any standard of review. To do so, courts must authentically interpret the legislative grant of authority, particularly to determine the appropriate intensity of review. To that end, the author suggests that the Court should discard two myths of administrative law: (1) that administrative decision-makers have expertise in matters of statutory interpretation; and (2) that jurisdictional questions exist. The myths may impose a different standard of review than the one discernible with the ordinary tools of statutory interpretation. These court-created devices should not exist at the expense of the constitutionally prescribed duty of the courts to interpret statutes to determine the standard of review.
A significance statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
In an upcoming set of cases, the Supreme Court of Canada will review its approach to the standard of review of administrative action. In this paper, the author suggests that the Court must go back to the foundation of judicial review in redesigning the standard of review: the task of courts to police the legal boundaries of the administrative state, on any standard of review. To do so, courts must authentically interpret the legislative grant of authority, particularly to determine the appropriate intensity of review. To that end, the author suggests that the Court should discard two myths of administrative law: (1) that administrative decision-makers have expertise in matters of statutory interpretation; and (2) that jurisdictional questions exist. The myths may impose a different standard of review than the one discernible with the ordinary tools of statutory interpretation. These court-created devices should not exist at the expense of the constitutionally prescribed duty of the courts to interpret statutes to determine the standard of review.
Key concepts: Supreme court, Statutory interpretation, Law, Statutory law, Judicial review, Political science, Administrative law, Standard of review