Two Myths of Administrative Law
Mark Mancini
Abstract
Open-access reader
Mark Mancini
Abstract
Open-access reader
In an upcoming set of cases, the Supreme Court of Canada will review its approach to the standard of review of administrative action. In this paper, the author suggests that the Court must go back to the foundation of judicial review in redesigning the standard of review, namely, the task of courts to police the legal boundaries of the administrative body. To do so, courts must authentically interpret the legislative grant of authority to the administrative decision-maker, particularly to determine the appropriate intensity of review. To that end, the author suggests that the Court should discard two myths that have pervaded modern administrative law: (1) that administrative decisionmakers should be granted deference based on purported expertise in matters of statutory interpretation; and (2) that jurisdictional questions exist separately from questions of law. The myths may impose a different standard of review than the one discernible with the ordinary tools of statutory interpretation. The author argues that these court-created devices should not exist at the expense of the constitutionally prescribed duty of the courts to exercise their policing function and engage in genuine statutory interpretation to determine the appropriate standard of judicial review in a given case.
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In an upcoming set of cases, the Supreme Court of Canada will review its approach to the standard of review of administrative action. In this paper, the author suggests that the Court must go back to the foundation of judicial review in redesigning the standard of review, namely, the task of courts to police the legal boundaries of the administrative body. To do so, courts must authentically interpret the legislative grant of authority to the administrative decision-maker, particularly to determine the appropriate intensity of review. To that end, the author suggests that the Court should discard two myths that have pervaded modern administrative law: (1) that administrative decisionmakers should be granted deference based on purported expertise in matters of statutory interpretation; and (2) that jurisdictional questions exist separately from questions of law. The myths may impose a different standard of review than the one discernible with the ordinary tools of statutory interpretation. The author argues that these court-created devices should not exist at the expense of the constitutionally prescribed duty of the courts to exercise their policing function and engage in genuine statutory interpretation to determine the appropriate standard of judicial review in a given case.
Key concepts: Statutory interpretation, Statutory law, Supreme court, Law, Administrative law, Judicial review, Deference, Political science