THE RISE IN EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION -- CONSEQUENCE OF A 'WAR FOR TALENTS'?
Katja Rost
Abstract
Open-access reader
Katja Rost
Abstract
Open-access reader
This research tests whether a war for talent provides an explanation for the rise in executive compensation in recent years. According to this, a shift toward transferable managerial skills requires higher compensation, particularly in large firms, to attract and retain managerial talents. Relying on an internationalized and deregulated managerial labor market, i.e. the Swiss banking sector, the empirical findings show that a shift in large firms explains the rise in executive compensation but does not improve firm performance. It is discussed how transferable managerial skills may used to legitimize higher compensation at the top.
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This research tests whether a war for talent provides an explanation for the rise in executive compensation in recent years. According to this, a shift toward transferable managerial skills requires higher compensation, particularly in large firms, to attract and retain managerial talents. Relying on an internationalized and deregulated managerial labor market, i.e. the Swiss banking sector, the empirical findings show that a shift in large firms explains the rise in executive compensation but does not improve firm performance. It is discussed how transferable managerial skills may used to legitimize higher compensation at the top.
Key concepts: Executive compensation, Compensation (psychology), Business, Accounting, Labour economics, Economics, Psychology, Social psychology