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The Condorcet Efficiency of the Preference Approval Voting and the Probability of Selecting the Condorcet Loser

Éric Kamwa

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Key concepts: Condorcet method, Approval voting, Voting, Mathematical economics, Preference, Bullet voting, Computer science, Mathematics

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