The Privilege Against Compelled Self-Incrimination
Charles E. Moylan, John O. Sonsteng
Abstract
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Charles E. Moylan, John O. Sonsteng
Abstract
Open-access reader
This article examines the fifth amendment right against compelled self-incrimination, as compared to principles in confession law. These two areas of law are not the same. In 1966, however, the Supreme Court decision of Miranda v. Arizona announced that many of the principles involved in confession law also implicated the fifth amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. The popular impact of Miranda has resulted in the equating of confession law with the fifth amendment privilege. This article examines the history of the fifth amendment privilege, its application, and how it can be distinguished from other, related areas of law.
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This article examines the fifth amendment right against compelled self-incrimination, as compared to principles in confession law. These two areas of law are not the same. In 1966, however, the Supreme Court decision of Miranda v. Arizona announced that many of the principles involved in confession law also implicated the fifth amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. The popular impact of Miranda has resulted in the equating of confession law with the fifth amendment privilege. This article examines the history of the fifth amendment privilege, its application, and how it can be distinguished from other, related areas of law.
Key concepts: Self-incrimination, Confession (law), Privilege (computing), Law, Political science, Supreme court