Combat Engineers--A Neglected Reconnaissance Asset?
William J. Bayles
Abstract
William J. Bayles
Abstract
This monograph investigates the idea of utilizing heavy force combat engineers to assist with intelligence collection efforts. Tactical commanders face large reconnaissance requirements but have limited assets to meet them. Supporting engineers have the potential of helping satisfy some of the commander’s critical information requirements. The monograph examines reconnaissance roles of combat engineers in the World War I1 era, as well as that of both U.S. and Soviet combat engineers today. U.S. reconnaissance doctrine is examined in light of its contribution to tactical intelligence. The study compares the current practice of the U.S. Army to our current combined arms and intelligence doctrines and to successful tactics and doctrine from the other armies and times. It also compares the reconnaissance training of combat engineers and cavalry scouts to determine if engineers have missions congruent with increased reconnaissance responsibilities. The study concludes that combat engineers have the capability to augment the intelligence collection effort and that the U.S. Army should institute doctrinal changes increasing their role. Publications needing revision include combined arms, intelligence, engineer, and training manuals. Both the role of the engineer personnel as well as the value of obstacle and terrain intelligence to the maneuver commander deserve greater doctrinal emphasis.
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This monograph investigates the idea of utilizing heavy force combat engineers to assist with intelligence collection efforts. Tactical commanders face large reconnaissance requirements but have limited assets to meet them. Supporting engineers have the potential of helping satisfy some of the commander’s critical information requirements. The monograph examines reconnaissance roles of combat engineers in the World War I1 era, as well as that of both U.S. and Soviet combat engineers today. U.S. reconnaissance doctrine is examined in light of its contribution to tactical intelligence. The study compares the current practice of the U.S. Army to our current combined arms and intelligence doctrines and to successful tactics and doctrine from the other armies and times. It also compares the reconnaissance training of combat engineers and cavalry scouts to determine if engineers have missions congruent with increased reconnaissance responsibilities. The study concludes that combat engineers have the capability to augment the intelligence collection effort and that the U.S. Army should institute doctrinal changes increasing their role. Publications needing revision include combined arms, intelligence, engineer, and training manuals. Both the role of the engineer personnel as well as the value of obstacle and terrain intelligence to the maneuver commander deserve greater doctrinal emphasis.
Key concepts: Doctrine, Military doctrine, Asset (computer security), Military intelligence, Engineering, Face (sociological concept), Aeronautics, Information warfare