Brigade Organization and the Airland Battle

AirLand Battle doctrine describes U.S. Army principles for operational and tactical warfighting and envision conditions of the next mid- to high-intensity war. Since promulgation of this new doctrine, the U.S. Army has made no attempt to redesign its basic tatical units, brigades and battalions, to match its radically altered view toward warfighting. This paper investigates the ability of heavy brigades to conduct AirLand Battle. Factors which influence organizational design of a combat unit -- are doctrine, training, leadership, command and control systems, objectives, forces available, forces opposed, characteristics of warfare, and relationships to higher echelon organizations -- are described and examined as they apply to the evolution of World War II infantry divisions. The changes in the infantry divisions show trends toward decentralizing combat, combat support, and combat service support units to lower levels, greater self-sufficiency in lower echelon units, and greater sustanability in lower echelon units. Finally, the theoretical factors influencing organizational design against today's brigade organization are compared. The lack of agility, sustainability, control, and combined arms training stand out as major shortcomings. The paper concludes that brigades should permanently contain units of all combat, combat support, and combat service support functions. The balance of these units should provide self-sufficiency in combat operations and sustainment for reasonable periods of time.