A Comment on Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem
Alec Sandroni, Alec Sandroni, Alvaro Sandroni, Alvaro Sandroni
Abstract
Alec Sandroni, Alec Sandroni, Alvaro Sandroni, Alvaro Sandroni
Abstract
Abstract Arrow (1950) famously showed the impossibility of aggregating individual preference orders into a social preference order (together with basic desiderata). This paper shows that it is possible to aggregate individual choice functions, that satisfy almost any condition weaker than WARP, into a social choice function that satisfy the same condition (and also Arrow’s desiderata).
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Abstract Arrow (1950) famously showed the impossibility of aggregating individual preference orders into a social preference order (together with basic desiderata). This paper shows that it is possible to aggregate individual choice functions, that satisfy almost any condition weaker than WARP, into a social choice function that satisfy the same condition (and also Arrow’s desiderata).
Key concepts: Arrow's impossibility theorem, Arrow, Impossibility, Social choice theory, Mathematical economics, Preference, Order (exchange), Function (biology)