2020Unpublished venueRequires access

Civilian Crisis Management in an Accountability Crisis?

Carolyn Moser

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Abstract

Abstract This chapter brings all the findings of this volume together. The point of departure was the finding of a de jure–de facto discrepancy regarding peacebuilding activities carried out under the CSDP: while the formal institutional and procedural features of EU peacebuilding are fundamentally intergovernmental, its administrative and operational realities have become Europeanized. This development prompts the question to what extent the transfer of powers by Member States to Brussels-based EU civilian crisis management structures has been matched with the establishment of appropriate accountability mechanisms at the European level. With a view to answering this interrogation, the chapter provides a concluding overview of existing accountability arrangements—political, legal, and administrative in nature—from both a de jure and a de facto perspective. The core finding is that while there is a considerable accountability deficit existing in law, this deficit has incrementally been countered by practice. As a result of this de facto readjustment of accountability, checks and balances are stronger at the EU than at Member State level, and individuals have de facto better—even though not perfect—judicial and administrative redress options at the supranational level. The conclusions further sketch out lessons learned, both for theory and practice, and provide an outlook on accountability in (civilian) CSDP.

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Abstract This chapter brings all the findings of this volume together. The point of departure was the finding of a de jure–de facto discrepancy regarding peacebuilding activities carried out under the CSDP: while the formal institutional and procedural features of EU peacebuilding are fundamentally intergovernmental, its administrative and operational realities have become Europeanized. This development prompts the question to what extent the transfer of powers by Member States to Brussels-based EU civilian crisis management structures has been matched with the establishment of appropriate accountability mechanisms at the European level. With a view to answering this interrogation, the chapter provides a concluding overview of existing accountability arrangements—political, legal, and administrative in nature—from both a de jure and a de facto perspective. The core finding is that while there is a considerable accountability deficit existing in law, this deficit has incrementally been countered by practice. As a result of this de facto readjustment of accountability, checks and balances are stronger at the EU than at Member State level, and individuals have de facto better—even though not perfect—judicial and administrative redress options at the supranational level. The conclusions further sketch out lessons learned, both for theory and practice, and provide an outlook on accountability in (civilian) CSDP.

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Available abstract

Abstract This chapter brings all the findings of this volume together. The point of departure was the finding of a de jure–de facto discrepancy regarding peacebuilding activities carried out under the CSDP: while the formal institutional and procedural features of EU peacebuilding are fundamentally intergovernmental, its administrative and operational realities have become Europeanized. This development prompts the question to what extent the transfer of powers by Member States to Brussels-based EU civilian crisis management structures has been matched with the establishment of appropriate accountability mechanisms at the European level. With a view to answering this interrogation, the chapter provides a concluding overview of existing accountability arrangements—political, legal, and administrative in nature—from both a de jure and a de facto perspective. The core finding is that while there is a considerable accountability deficit existing in law, this deficit has incrementally been countered by practice. As a result of this de facto readjustment of accountability, checks and balances are stronger at the EU than at Member State level, and individuals have de facto better—even though not perfect—judicial and administrative redress options at the supranational level. The conclusions further sketch out lessons learned, both for theory and practice, and provide an outlook on accountability in (civilian) CSDP.

Key concepts: Accountability, De facto, Peacebuilding, Political science, Public administration, Redress, Politics, Sketch

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Civilian Crisis Management in an Accountability Crisis? — Research Paper | ScholarLens