Electromagnetic information leakage for side-channel analysis of cryptographic modules
Noriyasu Homma, Takafumi Aoki, Ayano Satoh
Abstract
Noriyasu Homma, Takafumi Aoki, Ayano Satoh
Abstract
A new class of physical attacks against cryptographic modules, which is called the side-channel attack, is now drawing much attention. Side-channel attacks exploit information leakage from a physical implementation, such as power consumption and electro-magnetic (EM) radiation. This paper presents an overview of the recent trends in side-channel attacks, including EM analysis attacks, and related activities in the security evaluation of cryptographic modules.
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A new class of physical attacks against cryptographic modules, which is called the side-channel attack, is now drawing much attention. Side-channel attacks exploit information leakage from a physical implementation, such as power consumption and electro-magnetic (EM) radiation. This paper presents an overview of the recent trends in side-channel attacks, including EM analysis attacks, and related activities in the security evaluation of cryptographic modules.
Key concepts: Side channel attack, Cryptography, Information leakage, Power analysis, Exploit, Computer science, Computer security, Leakage (economics)