3. the End of the Bush Administration

During the later stages of the Bush Presidency, the United States undertook a number of steps aimed at coaxing Kiev toward START ratification and accession to the NPT. In addition to the offer of $175 million in Nunn-Lugar funds, the Bush administration took a number of other measures. In early October 1992 Undersecretary of State Frank Wisner visited Kiev to outline the U.S. willingness to assist Ukraine on HEU profit sharing, security assurances. He took concrete steps on discussing the early deactivation of the Ukrainian missiles even while START was still being debated and had not been ratified. On October 26, 1992, President Bush wrote to President Kravchuk outlining the basic U.S. position regarding many of the issues surrounding the nuclear question. Bush emphasized that the weapons needed to be transferred to Russia for dismantlement. He stated that any policy of dismantlement in Ukraine would be counter to Kiev's previous commitments and that it would be too costly as well as too time consuming. The United States was also committed to supporting Ukraine's desire to monitor the destruction of the warheads. The United States was also ready to assist Ukraine technically and financially in the dismantlement of the missiles and launchers. The President also declared that the United States was looking to supporting defense conversion projects in Ukraine. And, the President made clear, the United States supported an equitable sharing of the proceeds between Ukraine and Russia from the sale of the HEU derived from the dismantled warheads. (Ukraine, which claimed a right to the components of the weapons sought compensation for the highly enriched uranium--HEU--that the warheads contained. With discussion centering on the dismantlement of weapons in Russia, Kiev feared it would not receive compensation, thus prolonging a loss that was sustained when the tactical weapons were shipped to Russia in 1992, and for which no compensation was received at that time. This was one of the factors which drove Kiev's early insistence on conducting dismantlement in Ukraine, which would have entailed building ml appropriate facility). The United States, which, as late as May, had opposed any security assurances for Ukraine, had by now started a serious dialogue with Kiev on the issue. In early January 1993, the United States provided Kiev with draft security assurances and continued working with Russia and Britain to also provide similar assurances. The U.S. efforts had no success in moving the process forward. Indeed, the lame-duck status of the Bush administration appeared to be working against any quick success. With the election of President Clinton, there was a focus on the transition period, in Washington as well as Kiev. Nunn and Lugar, in their December report, realized the danger of the transition period and urged the outgoing and incoming administrations to stay in constant communication and that both should focus their energies on the former Soviet Union since the United States could not afford to a break from history. In Kiev there was an unspoken assumption that the possibility of obtaining a better deal with the new administration existed. And if that were not possible, then at least Kiev would be able to gain some more breathing room since any new administration would need time to get its people and policy in place. On two occasions in December, 1992, after the mid-December target for START ratification had passed, President Kravchuk stated that ratification would take place in January of the new year. On December 18, he stated that on January 15 START would be brought forth in the Rada and that within two days after that, ratification would take place. In a December 24 phone conversation with President Bush at Camp David, Kravchuk thanked the President for his December 4 letter offering $175 million in assistance for nuclear dismantlement. He stated that the Rada was studying the START documents and he was sure that the deputies would adopt them. …